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Abstract 
We study the impact of appointing women to top executive positions from an investor 
perspective. We analyze whether shareholders value announcement of appointment of women 
to top positions differently than they do appointment of men. This study uses an international 
sample of 100 announcements of top executive appointments of women who replace men and 
investigates how shareholders respond to such appointments. This research combines an event 
study with a matched pair analysis to compare the response from investors regarding 
appointment of female versus male CEOs and CFOs. We establish that investors do not seem 
to value appointment of women significantly differently from that of men. This finding 
suggests that, from the investor perspective, there appears to be no business case for a 
particular gender when it comes to appointing a CEO or CFO. 
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Introduction 
The lack of women in top management positions is a frequently discussed and researched topic in the 
business community and in the academic literature (Adams 2016). This literature is very diverse 
regarding theories and methods and the results are quite varying (see Post and Byron 2015). Often, 
performance and quality differentials between men and women are assumed to be behind the lack of 
equal female representation; reducing inequality is also thought to come at a cost (Bohnet et al. 2016; 
Golding 2014; Niederle et al. 2013). Others argue that a cultural gender bias causes the imbalance, 
thereby excluding talented people (Abdullah et al. 2016; Adams and Funk 2012; Hillman et al. 2002). 
Until recently, the focus of most of this research was on the role of women on boards, but there has 
emerged a new strand of literature that studies gender at the executive level as well (Dezsö et al. 2016; 
Faccio et al. 2016; Huang and Kisgen 2013; Kahn and Vieito 2013; Wang and Kelan 2013). The 
majority of studies on gender and firm performance rely on accounting data and focus on how firms 
respond to the presence of female executives. However, these studies usually disregard the investor 
perspective. One problem with most of this literature is that it is endogeneity-plagued, meaning that 
the decision to appoint a female board member need not be independent of firm characteristics or that 
both may be determined by hidden or omitted variables (i.e., explanatory variables may correlate with 
error terms). 
This study adds to the literature by investigating the role of gender at the top executive level 
from a shareholder perspective. Shareholders have incentives to thoroughly assess the potential impact 
of all types of news on firm equity value. Stock price reactions summarize expected changes in firm 
performance for all future dates. In our view, the forward looking perspective of the shareholder 
provides a highly relevant framework to study the role of gender in firm stock-price performance. 
Ahern and Dittmar (2012) focus on the stock price response to mandatory increases in female board 
representation. Our study focuses on the leading executive positions on the board. Thus far, perception 
of perceived suitability of men and women has been studied mainly experimentally. For example, 
Haslam and Ryan (2008) report experimental investigations among management graduates, high 
school students, and business leaders. We investigate, on the basis of stock market data, investor 
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perception regarding announcement of appointment of female top executives replacing males. We rely 
on the notion of market efficiency, which assumes that stock markets reflect the fundamental value of 
a listed firm, that is, the discounted sum of all expected future cash flows (i.e., the in-equilibrium 
perspective of markets, Demsetz 1983). From this perspective, only unexpected information can 
impact firm value, but not all such information need be actually value relevant. This notion is at the 
heart of finance theory (Demsetz 1983; Fama 1970, 1991, 1995; Jensen 1978). 
We investigate whether the announcement of appointment of a female CEO or CFO is 
followed by a response that is significantly different from announcement of appointment of a male top 
executive. Efficient market theory posits that if shareholders deem female representation beneficial, 
they will place a higher value on the firm. However, if shareholders believe that female representation 
worsens firm performance, which would reflect the view that the current situation of 
underrepresentation is optimal, they will lower firm valuation. Given these contrasting perspectives, 
the issue of which view actually holds is an empirical matter. Ideally, we could also establish what 
drives any such differential. Unfortunately, the sample does not contain enough observations to allow 
for a more structural approach (see Athey and Imbens 2017). 
This study investigates the positions of CEO and CFO, as they are the most important 
positions in a firm in that they are responsible for overall strategy and performance and usually are the 
“face” of the firm in relation to stakeholders and society. While the impact of the CEO on firm 
performance is substantial, it is also contingent on other key executives (see Carpenter and Sanders 
2002; Hambrick 1995); CFOs are critical in this respect, especially following introduction of the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (Chava and Purnanandam 2010; Gore et al. 2011). 
Our empirical strategy is to combine the event study methodology with a matched pair 
analysis to determine whether investors indeed respond differently to a female top executive 
appointment than to a male appointment. The results are of particular interest to investors, existing 
boards, and to recruiters for corporate boards, since this study is an empirical test of the notion that 
female CEOs and CFOs are “costly” (or not) from an investor perspective. From a societal 
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perspective, the study is relevant in that it sheds light on the value relevance of gender in top executive 
positions. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: First, we review the literature and present our 
hypotheses. We then detail methods to test our hypotheses and introduce the data. Next, we present 
and discuss our results. Finally, we summarize our findings and set forth our conclusions. 
Background and Hypotheses 
This section discusses the study background and introduces the hypotheses. The focus is on 
the literature regarding financial market performance and CEO turnover, then the literature on gender 
and boards, and finally on the literature on gender of top management and firm stock market 
performance. Then, our hypotheses are articulated. 
One strand of the literature addresses CEO turnover and stock market response. Investor 
reaction to CEO or management changes in general are widely investigated, but the results are mixed. 
Weisbach (1988), Denis and Denis (1995), Huson et al. (2004), and Pessarossi and Weill (2012) find 
positive market reactions to (forced) CEO turnover announcements. However, Reinganum (1985), 
Beatty and Zajac (1987), Warner et al. (1988), and Niño and Romero (2007) find no significant 
response. Further, Dedman and Lin (2002) establish that markets react negatively to CEO turnover 
announcements. A widely acknowledged problem is that the event of the announcement of a new CEO 
is usually confounded by that of the withdrawal of the old CEO. Financial market analysis is not 
suitable to disentangling the impact on firm equity value of this type of news. As such, it is not 
possible to separate investor response regarding these two aspects. There is a closely related literature 
on the background of the new CEO. In this respect, the distinction between insider and outsider is 
highlighted (e.g., Furtado and Rozeff 1987; Johnson 1996); usually, appointment of an insider as new 
CEO is more highly valued than appointment of an outsider. 
The gender differences literature relies predominantly on the governance perspective, is 
usually concerned about fairness issues, and investigates the role of gender mainly at the board level 
(Adams 2016; Adams and Ferreira 2009; Adams and Funk 2012; Bernardi et al. 2012; Haslam and 
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Kisgen 2008; Post and Byron 2015; Terjesen et al. 2009). The key notion here is that female directors 
bring different skills to the board. Board diversity may improve skill complementarities of the board as 
a whole (Anderson et al. 2011). In particular, women are regarded as being more risk-averse, less 
overconfident, and more sensitive to social signals in determining appropriate behavior (Croson and 
Gneezy 2009). Differences in talents, perspectives, and behavior between men and women, among 
many other factors, can affect the ability to monitor and discipline corporate managers (Hillman et al. 
2002). Post and Byron (2015) perform a meta-analysis of the literature on women on boards and firm 
performance. These authors review 140 studies and find that female board representation is positively 
associated with accounting returns, especially in countries with strong shareholder protection. One 
concern with this research is that the identification strategy does not clearly rule out that the choice of 
a female board member is related to particular board or firm characteristics. 
Another strand of literature consists of stock market performance studies regarding gender in 
relation to boards and top management. Post and Byron (2015) find that the relationship between 
female board representation and market performance is positive but not statistically significantly 
different from zero. Based on the results from more than 70 studies, Post and Byron (2015) find that 
female board representation is not significantly related to market performance. These authors also find 
that the mean effect size associated with female board representation and market returns is 
significantly lower than the mean effect size associated with female board representation and 
accounting returns. Most studies in this strand of literature focus on gender and boards. For example, 
Ahern and Dittmar (2012) find a negative impact on stock market returns from announcement of a 
mandatory increase in female board representation in Norway. Chapple and Humphrey (2014) find 
weak evidence of a negative correlation between multiple women on the board and market 
performance. In contrast, Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) find that investors do not appear to 
penalize firms that increase the number of female board members, and Francoeur (2008) finds that 
there is no statistically significant performance difference between firms with high and low female 
board member representation. Regarding top executives, Lee and James (2007) closely relates to our 
work. These authors study top management team announcements in the US from 1999 to 2000, which 
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included 17 announcements of female CEO appointments. They find that cumulative abnormal returns 
are significant for both male and female appointments. Lee and James (2007 p. 239) predict that “as 
women executives becomes less unique, there will be less difference in the reaction to the 
announcement of male appointments and female appointments.” These authors also show that 
investors react significantly more negatively to announcement of female CEOs than they do to 
announcement of male CEOs. This finding contrasts with results from studies about gender and boards 
that rely on accounting measures (see Post and Byron 2015). Adams (2016) is highly critical of 
research on female representation on boards and in top management. This author reflects particularly 
upon the weaknesses of the data (definitions, small sample sizes, sample selection) and the theory 
(especially causal inferences made) and calls for more research. The issue of endogeneity plays a 
particular role and is difficult to solve, due to the research designs in most of this literature (see also 
Antonakis et al. 2014). 
To complement these strands of the literature, this study first investigates the investor response 
regarding announcement of appointment of a new top executive. It researches the reaction of the total 
sample, consisting of both male and female appointments, by testing whether there is an abnormal 
stock market return following announcement of the appointment of a CEO or CFO. This also is done 
for the presence or absence of confounding information in the press bulletin that appears with the 
announcement; when firms produce such information, this could impact their stock returns. We 
hypothesize that the stock market reaction is more pronounced when such information is announced in 
the event window. Further, since the literature shows that insiders are valued more positively than 
outsiders, we expect that there is a more positive (less negative) reaction to the appointment of an 
outsider than to that of an insider. In addition, it is of interest whether the response to CEO 
appointments is stronger than those for CFO appointments, assuming that the CEO position is 
regarded as the most important function in the company. Further, this research extends the 
predominantly single-country studies to an investigation of the international setting using a sample 
with observations from 15 industrialized countries. 
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More importantly, based on the gender-role stereotyping hypothesis of Lee and James (2007), 
we expect a statistically significant difference in stock price reaction between announcement of 
appointment of female and male CEOs or CFOs. Therefore, the main hypothesis is as follows: Stock 
market return reaction after announcement of appointment of a female CEO/CFO is less strong than 
that following announcement of appointment of a male CEO/CFO. In all cases, the null hypothesis is 
that there are no statistically significant differences. 
Materials and Methods 
This research combines the event study approach with matched pair analysis to answer the 
research question. This section briefly explains the background of the event study methodology. It 
then discusses the endogeneity problem, sampling, and selection of matches. 
Event studies examine the short-term price behavior of securities around specific events 
(Binder 1998). Fama et al. (1969) find that stock markets are (semi-strong) efficient given the rapid 
adjustment of stock prices to a particular event. Event studies cannot be used to make inferences about 
causality. To this extent, alternative approaches are available (see Antonakis et al. 2010, 2014). 
However, we do not pursue these, as our objective is confined to assess whether there actually is 
something going on. Further, although our sample of female top executives is more than five times 
that of Lee and James (2007), it is nevertheless too small to employ sound statistical methods that 
would find determinants of any out- or under-performance. Note that even the event study can be 
affected by endogeneity problems if the decisions of the firms appointing either a male or female top 
executive are driven by some unknown underlying variable. Therefore, several sensitivity tests are 
conducted. 
Event studies are rooted in efficient market theory. Fama (1995 p. 76) states that “[…] in an 
efficient market, at any point in time, the actual price of a security will be a good estimate of its 
intrinsic value […].” A more general definition is provided by Jensen: “A market is efficient with 
respect to information set tθ  if it is impossible to make economic profits by trading on the basis of 
information set tθ ” (Jensen 1978 p. 96). Realization of the information set may change over time, but 
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no systematic economic profits can be made for any realization of this information set. The 
implication here is that whatever news is announced, investors will immediately incorporate its effect 
into the stock price; thus, the market is semi-strong efficient. In this case, there can be abnormal 
returns (in contrast to the case of strong market efficiency, where all information is known). 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) find that when investors are forward looking, turnover is more 
sensitive to accounting measures of performance compared to financial market measures. Hermalin 
and Weisbach (2003) argue that firms decide allocation of resources to governance and production 
simultaneously. Then, unless the dependency on common determinants is accounted for, the estimates 
of the association between governance and performance might be biased. This finding aligns with the 
view of Cook (2008) on how to account for news in financial markets. However, Cornelli et al. (2013) 
point out that corporate governance arrangements are a black box. Governance seems to be an 
unobservable variable usually measured by proxies assumed to correlate with the “true” but 
unobservable latent variable (Cornelli et al. 2013). By focusing on a very visible variable, namely 
gender, it might be possible to advance this debate. Of course, gender is just one aspect of governance 
and must not be viewed as a proxy for all arrangements. Stock market information is used, as this 
study concentrates on shareholder perception and not on firm performance in general. However, there 
can be a price reaction even in the absence of agency problems. For example, consider a female CEO 
unexpectedly replacing a male CEO with poor skills rather than a male CEO who makes poor 
management choices on purpose (as suggested in agency theory). In this case, it is likely that 
shareholders respond to this positive news with increased demand for the stock. 
The date on which the press release naming the top executive’s appointment is published by 
the particular company is used as the event day (τ = 0). To arrive at the expected stock market returns, 
we rely on the market and risk adjusted returns model (the market model) (MacKinlay 1997). There is 
a window before the announcement to estimate the expected return, and then these expected returns 
are confronted with the actual returns in the event window (the differential is the abnormal return). 
Returns (Ri,t) are calculated as: 
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Ri,τ  = ln(Pi,τ /Pi,τ – 1)           (1) 
where Pi,τ and Pi,τ – 1 are the share prices of firm i at the end of period τ and τ-1, respectively. This 
study relies on the return index of the firm to account for dividend payments and share repurchases. 
Abnormal return is the difference between actual return and normal (expected) return. In line with the 
literature (e.g., Pessarossi and Weill 2012), the estimation window within this study is set at [-160;-3]. 
Announcement of the appointment of the new CEO/CFO is at the event day (day 0). It is assumed that 
a response from market participants to the news about the appointment decision is tractable in the 
event window only. The sample is checked for potentially well-established confounding events like 
earnings warnings, stock splits, and divestiture/M&A rumors and announcements in the event 
window. The returns from the two days immediately before and after the announcement are added to 
the return on the announcement date itself to gauge the event’s total price impact. One issue is whether 
closer assessment of the impact would be preferable. Most stock exchanges require firms to produce 
value-relevant information (such as CEO turnover) outside trading hours. Therefore, the day is the best 
unit to determine the impact of this type of news (Brown and Warner 1985). Further, the estimation 
window and event window perfectly align in our case. 
Estimates of daily abnormal returns (ARs) for firm i at day τ can be derived using the 
following equation: 
ARi,τ = Ri,τ – αi – βi * Rm,τ         (2) 
where Rm,τ is the return of the (national) stock market index at day τ. α and β are parameters in the 
market model; α is the intercept term and β is systematic risk. Firm returns are related to those of the 
domestic stock market with respect to idiosyncratic risk (see Campbell et al. 2010). Average abnormal 
returns (AARs) are obtained by dividing the sum of the ARs by the number of events (N): 
AARτ = 
1
𝑁𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝜏𝜏𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1           (3) 
MacKinlay (1997) argues that event studies should make use of cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) when there is uncertainty about the exact date at which the information is incorporated in the 
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share price. Hence, the use of CARs is in line with the choice for a multiple-day event window. In this 
study, the windows [2;+2], [-1;+1] and [0,+1] are analyzed. Cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAARs) are calculated by taking the average of the individual CARs; CARs are calculated as follows: 
CARi [τ1,τ2] = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏2𝜏𝜏1          (4) 
Both parametric and non-parametric tests are employed to determine significance. The first is 
a standardized cross-sectional test by Boehmer et al. (1991). It is robust to mis-specification due to 
event-induced variance changes. The tests for AARs and the CAARs according to the standardized 
cross-sectional test are done in line with the calculations applied by Campbell et al. (2010). In 
addition, Corrado’s non-parametric rank test is used (Corrado 1989). The calculations for testing AARs 
are in Appendix A. Testing for CAARs is done using the same calculations as testing for AARs, but 
security-event i’s mean rank (K) across the days of the cumulative window is substituted in place of 
Ki,0 and the standard deviation (S(K)) is divided by the square root of the number of days in the 
cumulative window (see Campbell et al. 2010). 
The data are obtained from various sources. First, a representative number of press releases of 
appointments of female CEOs/CFOs was assembled. The Orbis Database was used to find firms 
announcing appointment of a female CEO/CFO and to collect information on firm sector, size, and 
location. We selected all announcements regarding the appointment of female CEOs and CFOs 
between January 2004 and March 2014. All appointments selected concern replacement of a male top 
executive by a female. Further, we check whether there is a listing on a stock exchange, information 
about the name of the CEO/CFO, the exact date of the announcement, the industry the firm is in, and 
the location of its headquarters. Stock return information of the particular firm’s stock and the 
corresponding market index (the prevailing national stock market index of the country where the 
announcing firm was headquartered) are obtained from Datastream. Afterwards, the announcement 
dates of these female executives were determined by searching for the corresponding press release on 
the company website as well as the function (CEO or CFO), whether the executive was an insider, and 
whether other relevant information was announced during the event window. In this case, ‘relevant’ is 
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defined as a press release covering the announcement of other executives or board members and as a 
press release related to financial issues, such as financial results and dividend declarations. The next 
step was to find matched pairs regarding announcements of appointments of female CEOs/CFOs. 
Announcements of male appointments (male CEOs/CFOs replacing another male top executive) are 
matched to announcements of female appointments as CEO/CFO using three matching criteria: size, 
industry, and announcement date. Size is measured as total assets, where we allow a range of 30% for 
the size of the match. The list of events and matches (see Appendix B) shows that the size criterion is 
met in all matches. In cases where the industry criterion is not met, the closest industry is chosen. 
Further, we investigate the international perspective and analyze whether performance might be 
related to cultural issues (Ioannou and Serafeim 2012). The study uses the Gender Gap Index of the 
World Economic Forum to arrive at scores and ranks of the countries in which the firm is 
headquartered (see Appendix C). 
The data collection process results in 105 announcements of female appointments in 15 
countries for the period 2004/1–2014/2. From this data set, five announcements are removed because 
of confounding events (stock splits, M&A announcements/divestitures, and earnings warnings) in the 
event window. Our final list of announcements consists of 100 announcements of female appointments 
and 100 matched announcements of male appointments. Two announcements took place on a Sunday 
(non-trading day); for these announcements, the next trading day is used as the event day. 
Table 1 presents an overview of the main characteristics of the data set. Regarding the size of 
the 200 companies involved (see Panel A), the table shows total assets of the average firm in the 
sample at USD 33.7 billion (median is 4.0 billion), operating revenues over assets at 111% (median 
82%), and number of employees at 24,447 (median 6,000). As to industry composition, Panel B shows 
that most announcements were in consumer goods, manufacturing, and other industries. Most 
announcements occurred in the second half of the period under investigation. As to the international 
dimension, most announcements were in the US. An overview of key properties of the AARs in the 
estimation window regarding the stock market response to turnover announcements is in Appendix D. 
It shows the results of the total sample (male and female appointments combined) and of female and 
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male appointments separately. We establish that the alfas are not significantly different from zero and 
that the betas are not significantly different from one. However, the betas for the sample of female 
CEO and CFO appointment announcements are slightly lower than those of the male appointments. 
This difference, however, is not statistically significant. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Results 
This section reports and discusses the results of our analysis with respect to the sample of 
announcements of male and female CEO/CFO appointments. First, the results of the main analysis are 
presented and then those of the sensitivity analysis. 
Main results 
Table 2 presents the results of the AAR for the total sample, consisting of 100 female and 100 
male appointments. The table shows a sign switch at the event day compared to the previous day. 
There is a negative AAR at the event day as well as on the first day after the event day. However, none 
of the reported ARs is statistically significant. Hence, the null regarding our first hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. Therefore, in contrast to, for example, Bonnier and Bruner (1989), but in line with Niño and 
Romero (2007) and Warner et al. (1988), our results suggest that there are no statistically significant 
abnormal stock market returns following announcement of appointment of a top executive. As a 
consequence, it seems that there is no (equity) value relevance in this particular news (see Fama 1970). 
This does not mean that there is absence of information, but that the information is not deemed value 
relevant by investors. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Next, we turn to the main hypothesis regarding the differential in the response to an 
announcement of the appointment of a man or woman as CEO/CFO. The results of the differences in 
AARs between female and male appointments are provided in Table 3. The difference is calculated as 
the AAR of the female appointment minus the AAR of the matched male appointment. Again, there is a 
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sign switch at the event day. The test statistics suggest that the ARs are not statistically significant, 
except that the parametric test shows a marginally significant AAR at day τ = 2. Because of this weak 
significance level and the fact that the Corrado test suggests insignificance, we conclude that the null 
hypothesis of no difference between the appointment announcement of female and male top executives 
cannot be rejected. Thus, in contrast to Lee and James (2007), our study finds that there is no 
statistically significant difference in stock price reaction after announcement of appointment of a 
female CEO/CFO compared to that of a male CEO/CFO. As a consequence, investors do not seem to 
differentiate in the valuation of the company upon appointment of a female CEO/CFO or a male 
CEO/CFO. This result is consistent with the findings in Post and Byron (2015), which depart from the 
shareholder perspective, but it contrasts with studies relying on accounting data (i.e., taking the firm 
perspective) in the case of gender and boards. The difference with Lee and James (2007) might be due 
to the fact that our study relies on a much larger sample (more than five times) of female top executive 
announcements. Further, our sample includes a time period for which investors have gained more 
experience with female CEOs and CFOs. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Next, the performance of firm stock over the event window is investigated. The results for 
three cumulative event windows are shown in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 shows the CAARs of 
appointments for the total sample, consisting of 100 female appointments and 100 male appointments. 
Table 5 shows the difference in CAARs between female appointments and their matched male 
appointments. Again the difference is calculated as ARs from a announcement of female appointment 
minus ARs from the matched announcement of male appointment. The CAAR for the [0;+1] window is 
negative in both the total sample and in the “difference sample.” But these negative returns are not 
statistically significant. Hence, it can be concluded that there are no statistically significant differences 
between the announcement of a new female or male CEO or CFO. As a consequence, the null 
hypothesis of no difference cannot be rejected. Therefore, for the cumulative windows as well, we 
conclude there are no abnormal stock market returns following announcement of appointment of a 
female CEO/CFO compared to a male CEO/CFO. 
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[Insert Tables 4-5 here] 
Robustness 
We use sensitivity analysis to arrive at a proper notion of the robustness of the main results. 
More specifically, four aspects are investigated: the role of confounding information, the appointed 
CEO/CFO being an insider or an outsider, the appointment relating to either the CEO or the CFO, and 
the international (cultural) dimension. 
The first sensitivity analysis focuses on the presence of potentially relevant additional 
information. Relevant information release relates to the press release accompanying the announcement 
covering announcement of other executives or board members and to financial issues, such as financial 
results and dividend declarations. This type of information presented could bias the ARs reported in 
the event window, because it is not clear to what information investors react. Non-relevant press 
releases do not include such information. It is expected that the stock market reaction is stronger when 
relevant information is announced during the event window.1 
The second sensitivity analysis addresses the insider/outsider distinction. Furtado and Rozeff 
(1987) and Lee and James (2007) find that insiders are valued more positively by investors than 
outsiders. It is therefore expected that the stock price reaction to appointment of an insider is more 
positive (less negative) than the reaction to appointment of an outsider. 
The third sensitivity analysis focuses on whether the announced executive is going to be either 
the CEO or the CFO of the company. Lee and James (2007) already make a distinction between CEO 
and other top management team appointments. Compared to CEO appointments, their results show 
weaker and even insignificant CAARs for top management team appointments. The hypothesis here is 
that the CEO may be seen as a more important function than the CFO. Therefore, it may be expected 
                                                          
1 In addition, as suggested by one of our reviewers, we accounted for the firms’ prior performance. To this 
extent, we compared the abnormal returns in the event window of firms with the 25% highest and those with the 
25% lowest performance in the estimation window. This shows that the mean and standard deviation of the 
abnormal returns in the event window of both groups were about the same (i.e., CAAR [-2;2] of firms with the 
25% lowest performance in the estimation window at 0.00077 versus that with the 25% highest performance at 
-0.00041), and that the lowest 25% had slightly lower positive skewness and more kurtosis. 
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that the stock price reaction after appointment of a CEO is more pronounced than that after 
appointment of a CFO. 
These three analyses were performed for the overall sample of 200 appointments for the [0;+1] 
cumulative window, and the results for the three pairs of subgroups were compared with an ANOVA 
to test for differences. The results of the sensitivity analyses are provided in Appendix E, Panels A–C 
respectively. This appendix shows that there are no statistically significant results for the sensitivity 
analyses employed in our study. Panel D of Appendix E reports the results of differences tests 
regarding the two subgroups in all three cases (namely additional relevant news, insider/outsider, and 
CEO/CFO). This panel shows that there is no significant difference between the subgroups in all three 
instances and suggests that there seems to be no difference in CAARs when relevant information is 
announced through press releases in the event window, whether the new CEO/CFO is an insider or 
not, and whether the appointment of a CEO or a CFO is announced. This finding is in line with the 
main results of this study. 
The fourth sensitivity analysis addresses the international dimension of our sample. To this 
extent, we use the scores from the World Economic Forum regarding the Gender Gap Index (see 
Appendix C). The index scores represent gender inequality. In this respect, it might be the case that 
distrust of a female CEO or CFO is greater in countries with greater inequality, as represented by a 
lower rank and score on the Gender Gap Index. In the sample, gender inequality is smallest in Finland 
(rank 2; score 0.845) and largest in Greece (rank 92; score 0.680). The weighted average rank of the 
sample is calculated, where the weights are based on the number of announcements. This yields an 
average weighted rank of 34, which happens to be the score of Luxembourg on the Gender Gap Index. 
Therefore, the announcements from Luxembourg are removed from the comparison of countries 
scoring relatively high or low on the Gender Gap Index. To be specific, the Gender Gap Index shows 
that Austria, Greece, Italy, and the US have scores below the weighted mean of the index (i.e., these 
countries are perceived as having relatively more gender inequality). Therefore, these countries are in 
the subsample labelled HIGH. Announcements from all other countries, except Luxembourg, are 
labelled LOW. Further, there is a comparison of the responses to US and non-US announcements of 
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appointment of a female CEO or CFO, as the US makes up more than half the total sample and 
because Lee and James (2007) rely on US data only. 
The results of the international analysis are shown in Appendix F. Panel A compares the 
responses in the subsamples of countries to all announcements. This panel shows that in countries with 
relatively high scores on the Gender Gap Index, there is a slightly more pronounced (positive) 
response from the stock market to turnover announcements than in countries with a low score on the 
index. For the US, the response is slightly more pronounced than elsewhere (but not on days -2 and -1 
in the event window). Next, Panel B presents a comparison of the stock market response to the 
announcement of male CEOs and CFOs. This panel shows that there are no substantial differences 
between the subgroups. Panel C compares responses to announcements of female top executives. 
From this panel, we conclude that the response in countries with a relatively high rank on the gender 
inequality index, as well as the response in the US, is more positive than the response in countries 
ranking low on the gender inequality index and outside the US, respectively. However, the responses 
themselves are not statistically significantly different from zero in each of the subgroups. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that there is some international heterogeneity regarding the response to female 
appointment but that relevant subsamples (i.e., performing relatively high or low on the Gender Gap 
Index and US versus elsewhere) do not show statistically significant ARs. This finding contrasts with 
the findings of Ahern and Dittmar (2012) for boards, but confirms the main findings of our paper. 
Panel D confirms the overall conclusion inferred from the previous three panels—namely that stock 
market participants seem to respond more strongely and more positively to announcements of female 
top executives in countries that rank high on the gender index, as well as in the US, than to those 
elsewhere, but that there is no statistically significant response to (differences in) gender with such 
announcements. This conclusion is in line with Post and Byron (2015), who also did not come across 
significant international differences. 
We conclude that there are no statistically significant differences between the stock market 
responses to female versus male CEO/CFO appointments. We establish that, from an investor 
perspective, it does not matter whether a man or a woman is appointed to the board of directors as a 
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CEO or CFO. This result contrasts with studies that find positive effects from female executive tenure 
and firm financial performance (Deszö et al. 2016; Faccio et al. 2016; Huang and Kisgen 2013; Kahn 
and Vieito 2013; Wang and Kelan 2013), but is in line with the predictions of Lee and James (2007) 
and the findings of Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) and Francoeur (2008). Our conclusion is 
reminiscent of the analysis of Hermalin and Weisbach (1998). These authors argue that stock prices 
reflect not only the present, but also the future, which implies that abnormal stock prices can 
underestimate the effect of an announced turnover change on firm performance. However, shareholder 
response is a genuine reflection of shareholder perception about the impact of an (unexpected) 
announcement regarding the equity value of a firm. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This study investigates the impact of the unexpected announcement of appointment of female 
CEOs and CFOs on the equity value of firms. Most of the literature on gender and performance thus 
far investigates the impact of female board membership on performance by using accounting 
information. In contrast, our focus is on the response of shareholders. This study assumes semi-strong 
market efficiency, which holds that market participants account for all relevant information in pricing 
financial assets. As such, unexpected news will be followed by significant changes in stock market 
returns only if it is deemed value-relevant. If the news does not affect stock market returns, it seems to 
be irrelevant to firm valuation according to shareholders. 
We study announcements of 100 female CEO/CFO appointments in 15 countries over the 
period 2004–2014 and match these with announcements of appointments of male CEOs/CFOs. All 
new appointments replace males. For the overall response to announcement of a CEO/CFO change, 
there is no significant abnormal stock price reaction. This finding is in line with other studies on 
changes in governance (Warner et al. 1988; Wessels et al. 2017). Examination of the differences in 
stock price reactions regarding announcement of female and male CEO/CFO appointments shows that 
any differences between women and men are not statistically significant. This result contrasts with Lee 
and James (2007), who study 17 female top executive appointments in 1999–2000. We conclude that 
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there is no significant difference in average abnormal returns after announcement of the appointment 
of a female CEO/CFO versus a male CEO/CFO appointment. This conclusion suggests that there is no 
gender difference regarding how investors value appointment of CEOs/CFOs. 
The finding that gender of these top executives does not seem to be value relevant from the 
investor perspective contrasts with studies that employ alternative research designs that disregard the 
investor perspective or that focus on the board rather than CEOs/CFOs. Most studies find that firms 
with female directors generally somewhat underperform those consisting of only men (Ahern and 
Dittmar 2012; Chapple and Humphrey 2014 Lee and James 2007). It might be that strict reliance on 
market efficiency theory and the much larger sample are responsible for our result. Another difference 
is that our study is based on an international sample, whereas most previous studies focus on the US 
only. Further, our sample relates to a more recent period (when Sarbanes–Oxley regulation is in place) 
in which market participants have become more experienced with female CEOs/CFOs. The absence of 
a significant difference in the response to announcement of male and female CEO/CFO appointment 
also is in line with the prediction made by Lee and James (2007). These authors expected that, as 
women executives become less unique, there will be less difference in outcome variables between the 
announcement of male and female appointments. Finally, although our research design relies on 
efficient market theory, which has often been criticized as highly biased toward the status quo (Roscoe 
2014; Sedláček 2011), it yields results that are in line with those based on other perspectives, such as 
agency theory (see Carter et al. 2003, 2010). Also, our method is much less plagued by endogeneity 
than most of the studies reviewed in Post and Byron (2015). 
This study cannot be used to make inferences about the causality of news of appointment of 
top executives and the response (or the lack thereof) from stock market participants. However, several 
sensitivity checks were performed. These confirm the main findings; nevertheless, it is not possible to 
be entirely sure (type 1 and type 2 error may be present). Another important caveat to our conclusions 
is that although the study includes many more female top executives than most previous studies in this 
area, it faces data limitations. With 100 announcements of female CEO or CFO appointments, the 
sample is still quite small. Therefore, one cannot be sure that there is no gender effect of CEO/CFO 
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appointments on shareholder value. It might be that investors do not perceive a value difference or 
there simply are not enough observations to filter out noise and allow statistical inference to convey 
the truth. In particular, expanding the analysis to a regression setting and accounting for controlling 
factors would require many more observations to warrant drawing robust conclusions. Further, our 
methodology can be applied only to public companies. In addition, our sample is skewed toward 
companies from industrialized countries. As such, we agree with Adams (2016) and Antonakis et al. 
(2010, 2014), who call for improved data and theory in this respect. 
From a practical perspective, the implications of our study are that it seems that firms need not be 
afraid they will be punished by shareholders when they appoint women as CEOs or CFOs. However, 
our findings pertain only to the sample studied; they do not imply that appointment of women or men 
as such will never become value relevant. We trust that investors first and foremost will have a keen 
eye on the managerial qualities of the prospective CEO or CFO. 
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Appendices  
Appendix A   
Abbreviations 
N  = number of firms  
Li  = number of observed returns for security i (Mi + Wi) 
Mi = number of non-missing estimation period returns for security i 
Wi = number of non-missing event window returns for security i 
ARi.E = abnormal return of security i on the event day 
ARi.τ = abnormal return of security i on day τ 
SRi.E  = security i's standardized residual on the event day 
Tτ = number of days in the estimation period s�I = security i's estimated standard deviation abnormal returns in the estimation period 
Rm.E = market return on the event day 
Rm.τ = market return on day τ R�m = average market return during the estimation period 
CARi.  = cumulative abnormal return for security i  
τ1. τ2 = beginning and ending day of the cumulative window  
SCARi.[τ1.τ2] = standardized cumulative abnormal return 
SCARi.[τ1.τ2] = estimated standard deviation of each CARi.[τ1.τ2] R�m_est = mean daily national market-index return in the estimation period 
Ki.τ = rank of security i on day τ K� = expected rank 
S(K) = standard deviation of the sample mean abnormal return ranks 
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Standardized cross-sectional test 
Average Abnormal Return (AAR) 
Test statistic: 
Zτ = 
1
N
∑ SRNi=1 i.E / � 1N(N−1)∑ (SRi. E −  ∑ SRi.EN )2Ni=1Ni=1      (5) 
with: 
SRi.E = ARi.E / s�i �1 + 1
Tτ
+ (Rm.E− R�m)2
∑ (Rm.t−R�m)2Tτt=1        (6) 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) 
Standardized cumulative abnormal return: 
SCARi.[τ1.τ2] = CARi.[τ1.τ2] / SCARi.[τ1.τ2]       (7) 
with: 
SCARi.[τ1.τ2] = (
1
Mi−2
 ∑ ARi2−3k=−160 )1/2{ Wi[1+WiMi+(∑ Rm.τ−WiR�m_est)2τ2t=τ1∑ Rm.τ−R�m_est)2−3t=−160 ]}1/2  (8) 
Test statistic: 
Zτ = 
∑ SCARi[τ1.τ2]Ni=1
√NSSCAR
          (9) 
where  
SSCAR = [
1
N−1
∑ (SCARi[τ1. τ2] − 1
N
∑ SCARi[τ1. τ2])Ni=1 2]1/2Ni=1     (10) 
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Corrado’s rank test 
Ki.τ = rank (ARi.τ)          (11) 
Test statistic: 
trank = 
1
N
∑ (Ni=1  Ki.τ - K�) / S(K)         (12) 
where  
S(K) = {1
Li
∑ [(1
N
∑ Ki. τ)Ni=1 −+2t=−160 K�)2}1/2       (13) 
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Appendix B – Events and Matches (This appendix gives the key characteristics of all the events used in the analysis) 
# Company Industry CEO/CFO Full name Gender 
Announce-
ment date Position 
Total assets 
(last available 
year) 
1000USD 
Country where 
company is 
headquartered 
1 RHI  
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic 
products 
Mag. Barbara Potisk-
Eibensteiner F 27-3-2012 CFO 2.441.286 Austria 
M1 
JAMES HARDIE 
INDUSTRIES  
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic 
products Mr Matthew Marsh M 12-6-2013 CFO 2.107.600 Ireland 
2 BELGACOM  Post & telecommunications 
Mrs Dominique Charlotte 
Germaine Suzanne Leroy F 9-1-2014 CEO 10.833.593 Belgium 
M2 
HELLENIC 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
ORGANIZATION  Post & telecommunications Mr Michael Tsamaz M 22-10-2010 CEO 11.029.920 Greece 
3 GREENYARD FOODS Food, beverages, tobacco Mrs Valerie Vanhoutte F 23-10-2013 CFO 1.003.897 Belgium 
M3 SENECA FOODS  Food, beverages, tobacco Mr Timothy Benjamin M 31-5-2012 CFO 803.149 USA 
4 
TELENET GROUP 
HOLDING  Post & telecommunications Mrs Birgit Maria Conix F 26-8-2013 CFO 5.411.039 Belgium 
M4 HAVAS Post & telecommunications Mr Francois Laroze M 16-12-2013 CFO 6.222.290 France 
5 GREENYARD FOODS Food, beverages, tobacco Mrs Marleen Vaesen F 9-10-2012 CEO 1.003.897 Belgium 
M5 
PHARMERICA 
CORPORATION Wholesale & retail trade Mr David W. Froesel  M 2-8-2013 CEO 886.300 USA 
6 BRODRENE HARTMANN Wholesale & retail trade Mrs Marianne Rorslev Bock F 27-2-2012 CFO 201.693 Denmark 
M6 PANOSTAJA  Wholesale & retail trade Mr Simo Mustila  M 29-10-2010 CFO 172.288 Finland 
7 TDC  Post & telecommunications 
Mrs Pernille Lyngvold 
Erenbjerg F 21-3-2011 CFO 11.223.692 Denmark 
M7 
HELLENIC 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
ORGANIZATION  Post & telecommunications Mr Babis Mazarakis M 28-6-2012 CFO 11.029.920 Greece 
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8 SUOMINEN  Textiles, wearing apparel, leather Mrs Nina Marietta Kopola F 22-11-2011 CEO 368.033 Finland 
M8 IC COMPANYS  Textiles, wearing apparel, leather Mr Rud Trabjerg Pedersen M 21-8-2013 CEO 353.067 Denmark 
9 BOURSORAMA Banks Mrs Marie Cheval F 19-3-2013 CEO 6.384.972 France 
M9 
AFFILIATED MANAGERS 
GROUP Banks Mr Sean M. Healey M 26-10-2010 CEO 6.187.100 USA 
10 PIERRE ET VACANCES  Hotels & restaurants 
Mrs Francoise Dominique 
Raymonde Gri F 5-11-2012 CEO 2.214.300 France 
M10 
PINNACLE 
ENTERTAINMENT  Hotels & restaurants Mr Anthony Sanfilippo M 15-3-2010 CEO 2.108.994 USA 
11 ACCOR  Hotels & restaurants Mrs Sophie Stabile F 10-5-2010 CFO 9.974.664 France 
M11 
WYNDHAM 
WORLDWIDE  Hotels & restaurants Mr Thomas G. Conforti M 8-9-2009 CFO 9.463.000 USA 
12 JCDECAUX  Other services Mrs Laurence Debroux F 6-5-2010 CFO 5.734.772 France 
M12 BUREAU VERITAS  Other services Mr Sami Badarani M 2-11-2011 CFO 5.020.317 France 
13 QSC  Post & telecommunications Mrs Barbara Stolz F 20-3-2013 CFO 510.777 Germany 
M13 BALDA  Post & telecommunications Mr Dieter Brenken M 5-9-2013 CFO 470.447 Germany 
14 
PFEIFFER VACUUM 
TECHNOLOGY  Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mrs Nathalie Benedikt F 6-11-2012 CFO 588.006 Germany 
M14 PKC GROUP  Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mr Juha Torniainen M 4-4-2012 CFO 639.987 Finland 
15 
SMA SOLAR 
TECHNOLOGY  Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mrs Lydia Rosina Sommer F 17-10-2012 CFO 1.753.055 Germany 
M15 ELRINGKLINGER Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mr Stefan Wolf M 28-1-2005 CFO 1.673.779 Germany 
16 DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA Transport Miss Simone Menne F 7-5-2012 CFO 37.496.027 Germany 
M16 
UNITED CONTINENTAL 
HOLDINGS Transport Mr John Rainey M 16-4-2012 CFO 37.628.000 USA 
17 NORDWEST HANDEL Wholesale & retail trade Mrs Annegret Franzen F 14-2-2012 CFO 224.648 Germany 
M17 SHW  Wholesale & retail trade Mr Sascha Rosengart M 7-5-2013 CFO 237.458 Germany 
18 CELESIO  Wholesale & retail trade Mrs Marion Helmes F 20-12-2011 CFO 10.461.126 Germany 
M18 WOLSELEY  Wholesale & retail trade Mr John Martin M 25-1-2010 CFO 10.783.414 UK 
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19 ALNO AG Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mrs Ipek Demirtas F 13-7-2011 CFO 221.992 Germany 
M19 SUSS MICROTEC  Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mr Michael Knpp M 10-5-2007 CFO 237.605 Germany 
20 
NATIONAL BANK OF 
GREECE SA Banks Miss Paula N. Hadjisotiriou F 10-7-2013 CFO 138.271.532 Greece 
M20 
ANNALY CAPITAL 
MANAGEMENT  Banks Mr Glenn A. Votek M 19-8-2013 CFO 133.452.300 USA 
21 INGERSOLL-RAND  Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mrs Susan K Carter F 5-9-2013 CFO 18.492.900 Ireland 
M21 PACCAR  Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mr Robert Christensen M 30-12-2012 CFO 18.627.800 USA 
22 GLOBAL INDEMNITY PLC Insurance companies Mrs Cynthia Y Valko F 15-9-2011 CEO 1.903.703 Ireland 
M22 
TRIPLE-S 
MANAGEMENT  Insurance companies Mr Mr. Amilcar L. Jordan M 5-6-2012 CEO 2.059.344 USA 
23 
GRUPPO EDITORIALE 
L'ESPRESSO  Publishing, printing Mrs Monica Mondardini F 29-4-2013 CEO 1.732.933 Italy 
M23 PTC. Publishing, printing Mr James E Heppelman M 10-5-2010 CEO 1.828.906 USA 
24 IL SOLE 24 ORE  Publishing, printing Mrs Donatella Treu F 12-3-2010 CEO 669.362 Italy 
M24 
INDEPENDENT NEWS & 
MEDIA PUBLIC LIMITED 
COMPANY Publishing, printing Mr Vincent Crowley M 19-4-2012 CEO 593.730 Ireland 
25 HURTIGRUTEN  Transport Mrs Asta Sofie Lassesen F 6-9-2011 CFO 946.174 Norway 
M25 ARKANSAS BEST  Transport Mr Michael Newcity M 28-5-2010 CFO 1.034.462 USA 
26 RTL GROUP  Other services Mrs Anke Schaeferkordt F 7-2-2012 CEO 10.420.621 Luxembourg 
M26 GAGFAH  Other services Mr Thomas Zinnocker M 22-3-2013 CEO 10.702.049 Luxembourg 
27 ORDINA N Post & telecommunications 
Mrs Marijke Jolanda Poots 
Bijl F 28-3-2013 CFO 418.231 Netherlands 
M27 IDT CORP Post & telecommunications Mr Marcelo Fisscher M 6-6-2006 CFO 435.407 USA 
28 
SENSATA 
TECHNOLOGIES  Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling 
Ms Martha Newman 
Sullivan F 25-4-2012 CEO 3.648.391 Netherlands 
M28 TRELLEBORG  Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mr Peter Nilsson M 9-6-2005 CEO 4.174.033 Sweden 
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29 POSTNL  Post & telecommunications Mrs Hendrica Verhagen F 19-4-2012 CEO 6.143.126 Netherlands 
M29 HAVAS Post & telecommunications Mr Yannick Bolloré M 8-1-2014 CEO 6.222.290 France 
30 HAFSLUND  Gas, Water, Electricity Mrs Heidi Ulmo F 30-4-2012 CFO 4.451.346 Norway 
M30 DYNEGY  Gas, Water, Electricity Mr Clint C. Freeland M 23-6-2011 CFO 4.535.000 USA 
31 
GJENSIDIGE 
FORSIKRING  Insurance companies 
Mrs Catharina Elisabeth 
Hellerud F 16-12-2011 CFO 16.792.406 Norway 
M31 CINCINNATI FINANCIAL  Insurance companies Mr Michael J. Sewell M 25-4-2011 CFO 16.192.000 USA 
32 SWEDISH MATCH  Food, beverages, tobacco Mrs Marlene Forsell F 9-9-2013 CFO 2.209.394 Sweden 
M32 HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP  Food, beverages, tobacco Mr Stephen J. Smith M 21-8-2013 CFO 2.258.494 USA 
33 KNOWIT  Other services Mrs Anna Jennehov F 5-12-2012 CFO 248.125 Sweden 
M33 PROACT IT GROUP  Other services Mr Kristian Shaw M 13-11-2013 CFO 229.504 Sweden 
34 ELECTRA GRUPPEN  Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mrs Anneli Sjostedt F 5-9-2012 CEO 72.048 Sweden 
M34 VITROLIFE  Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mr Thomas Axelsson  M 18-4-2012 CEO 71.058 Sweden 
35 HEXPOL  
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic 
products 
Mrs Karin Elisabeth 
Bachmann Gunnarsson F 17-8-2012 CFO 908.141 Sweden 
M35 
STO 
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic 
products Mr Rolf Wohrle M 31-8-2010 CFO 902.798 Germany 
36 CYBERCOM GROUP  Other services Mrs Camilla Oberg F 10-4-2012 CFO 208.189 Sweden 
M36 TRADEDOUBLER  Other services Mr Rob Wilson M 29-6-2012 CFO 182.962 Sweden 
37 RATOS  Other services 
Mrs Susanna Margareta 
Campbell F 26-1-2012 CEO 5.161.042 Sweden 
M37 FUGRO  Other services Mr P. van Riel M 16-1-2006 CEO 5.501.523 Netherlands 
38 REJLERS  Other services 
Mrs Eva Katarina Viola 
Nygren F 12-1-2012 CEO 107.925 Sweden 
M38 VICTORIA PARK A Other services Mr Peter Strand M 21-8-2013 CEO 107.251 Sweden 
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39 ASSA ABLOY  Metals & metal products 
Mrs Carolina Dybeck 
Happe F 12-12-2011 CFO 9.202.245 Sweden 
M39 SSAB  Metals & metal products Mr Hakan Folin M 27-2-2013 CFO 9.012.069 Sweden 
40 ACANDO  Publishing, printing 
Mrs Anneli Elisabeth 
Lindblom F 9-11-2011 CFO 162.432 Sweden 
M40 
MARTHA STEWART 
LIVING OMNIMEDIA  Publishing, printing Mr Ken West M 6-9-2011 CFO 154.260 USA 
41 BEIJER ELECTRONICS  Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mrs Anna Kristina Belfrage F 29-8-2011 CFO 217.856 Sweden 
M41 LAGERCRANTZ GROUP  Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mr Bengt Lejdström M 28-9-2011 CFO 245.670 Sweden 
42 BILLERUDKORSNAS AB Wood, cork, paper 
Miss Susanne Karin 
Lithander F 11-7-2011 CFO 3.800.907 Sweden 
M42 METSA BOARD  Wood, cork, paper Mr Markus Holm M 13-9-2013 CFO 3.403.392 Finland 
43 INVESTOR  Other services 
Ms Susanne Maria 
Elisabeth Ekblom F 29-4-2011 CFO 35.305.558 Sweden 
M43 
AUTOMATIC DATA 
PROCESSING  Other services Mr Jan Siegmund M 1-11-2012 CFO 32.268.100 USA 
44 ATRIUM LJUNGBERG  Other services Ingalill Berglund F 14-3-2011 CEO 3.915.274 Sweden 
M44 
MOODY'S 
CORPORATION Other services Mr Raymond W. McDaniel M 26-4-2005 CEO 3.960.900 USA 
45 ADDTECH  Other services Mrs Kristina Willgard F 9-7-2010 CFO 469.272 Sweden 
M45 CDI  Other services Mr Robert M Larney M 25-8-2011 CFO 400.705 USA 
46 
DECHRA 
PHARMACEUTICALS  
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic 
products 
Mrs Anne-Francoise 
Michele Nesmes F 31-1-2013 CFO 637.551 UK 
M46 MCBRIDE  
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic 
products Mr Richard Armitage M 3-8-2009 CFO 692.185 UK 
47 IMPELLAM GROUP  Other services Ms Julia Robertson F 8-4-2013 CEO 590.961 UK 
M47 
MICHAEL PAGE 
INTERNATIONAL  Other services Mr Steve Ingham M 16-12-2005 CEO 545.606 UK 
48 SMITH & NEPHEW  Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mrs Julie Belita Brown F 19-11-2012 CFO 5.642.000 UK 
M48 MEGGITT  Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mr Doug Webb M 6-6-2013 CFO 6.130.056 UK 
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49 RECKITT BENCKISER  
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic 
products Ms Mary Elizabeth Doherty F 23-11-2010 CFO 23.796.239 UK 
M49 MONSANTO  
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic 
products Mr Pierre Courduroux M 22-12-2010 CFO 20.664.000 USA 
50 DIAGEO  Food, beverages, tobacco Mrs Deirdre Ann Mahlan F 11-5-2010 CFO 38.513.256 UK 
M50 
BRITISH AMERICAN 
TOBACCO  Food, beverages, tobacco Mr Ben Stevens M 28-2-2008 CFO 43.122.005 UK 
51 EASYJET  Transport Ms Carolyn Julia McCall F 23-3-2010 CEO 7.126.704 UK 
M51 IRON MOUNTAIN  Transport Mr William Meaney M 3-12-2012 CEO 6.358.339 USA 
52 LACLEDE GROUP  Gas, Water, Electricity Mrs Suzanne Sitherwood F 21-6-2011 CEO 3.125.386 USA 
M52 
DAYTON POWER AND 
LIGHT COMPANY Gas, Water, Electricity Mr Phil Herrington M 5-3-2012 CEO 3.464.200 USA 
53 
AMBAC FINANCIAL 
GROUP Insurance companies Mrs Diana Newman Adams F 13-6-2011 CEO 26.165 USA 
M53 SPARK NETWORKS Other services Mr Greg Liberman M 11-4-2011 CEO 28.364 USA 
54 
HEWLETT-PACKARD 
COMPAN Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mrs Meg Whitman F 22-9-2011 CEO 105.676.000 USA 
M54 INTEL  Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mr Brian Krzanich M 2-5-2013 CEO 92.358.000 USA 
55 JPMORGAN CHASE &  Banks Miss Marianne Lake F 19-11-2012 CFO 2.415.689.000 USA 
M55 BANK OF AMERICA  Banks Mr Bruce Thompson M 15-4-2011 CFO 2.102.273.000 USA 
56 
EXPRESS SCRIPTS 
HOLDING  Wholesale & retail trade Mrs Catherine R Smith F 14-1-2014 CFO 58.111.200 USA 
M56 CARREFOUR  Wholesale & retail trade Mr Pierre-Jean Sivignon M 26-9-2013 CFO 60.486.571 France 
57 MICROSOFT  Publishing, printing Mrs Amy E Hood F 8-5-2013 CFO 142.431.000 USA 
M57 
INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS MACHINES  Other services Mr Martin J. Schroeter M 7-11-2013 CFO 126.223.000 USA 
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58 BEST BUY CO Wholesale & retail trade Mrs Sharon L McCollam F 12-11-2012 CFO 16.787.000 USA 
M58 
LIBERTY INTERACTIVE  
INTERACTIVE GROUP Wholesale & retail trade Mr Christopher W. Shean M 25-10-2011 CFO 15.115.000 USA 
59 INTERNATIONAL PAPER  Wood, cork, paper Mrs Carol Louise Roberts F 25-10-2011 CFO 31.528.000 USA 
M59 
NATIONAL OILWELL 
VARCO. Wholesale & retail trade Mr Jeremy Thigpen M 6-12-2012 CFO 31.484.000 USA 
60 STAPLES  Wholesale & retail trade Mrs Christine T Komola F 27-9-2011 CFO 12.280.005 USA 
M60 SYSCO  Wholesale & retail trade Mr R. Chris Kreidler M 10-9-2009 CFO 12.663.947 USA 
61 
OCCIDENTAL 
PETROLEUM  Primary sector Mrs Cynthia L Walker F 20-7-2012 CFO 64.210.000 USA 
M61 APACHE  Primary sector Mr Alfonso Leon M 14-2-2014 CFO 60.737.000 USA 
62 XEROX  Other services Mrs Kathryn A Mikells F 28-3-2013 CFO 30.015.000 USA 
M62 
CAESARS 
ENTERTAINMENT 
CORPORATION Other services Mr Donald Colvin M 15-11-2012 CFO 27.998.100 USA 
63 SOUTHWEST AIRLINES  Transport Ms Tammy Romo F 30-8-2012 CFO 19.345.000 USA 
M63 
PLAINS ALL AMERICAN 
PIPELINE  Transport Mr Al Swanson M 21-8-2007 CFO 19.235.000 USA 
64 GLOBAL PARTNERS  Wholesale & retail trade Mrs Daphne H Foster F 24-4-2013 CFO 2.329.752 USA 
M64 NGL ENERGY PARTNERS  Wholesale & retail trade Mr Atanas H. Atanasov M 8-5-2013 CFO 2.291.347 USA 
65 NORFOLK SOUTHERN  Transport Ms Marta R Stewart F 20-9-2013 CFO 30.342.000 USA 
M65 CSX CORP Transport Mr Fredrik J. Eliassion M 23-1-2012 CFO 31.782.000 USA 
66 AVON PRODUCTS  
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic 
products 
Mrs Sherilyn S. (Sheri) 
McCoy F 9-4-2012 CEO 7.382.500 USA 
M66 
ENDO HEALTH 
SOLUTIONS. 
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic 
products Mr Rajiv De Silva M 25-2-2013 CEO 6.568.559 USA 
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67 AVON PRODUCTS  
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic 
products Mrs Kimberly A Ross F 23-5-2011 CFO 7.382.500 USA 
M67 
ENDO HEALTH 
SOLUTIONS 
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic 
products Mr Suketu Upadhyay M 9-9-2013 CFO 
6.568.559 
USA 
68 FAMILY DOLLAR STORES Wholesale & retail trade Mrs Mary A Winston F 10-4-2012 CFO 3.709.861 USA 
M68 
IAC/INTERACTIVE 
GROUP Wholesale & retail trade Mr Jeff Kip M 6-2-2012 CFO 3.805.828 USA 
69 
ESTEE LAUDER 
COMPANIES  
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic 
products Miss Tracey Thomas Travis F 19-7-2012 CFO 7.145.200 USA 
M69 OWENS CORNING 
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic 
products Mr Michael C. Mcmurray M 16-8-2012 CFO 7.568.000 USA 
70 XCEL ENERGY  Gas, Water, Electricity Mrs Teresa S Madden F 19-9-2011 CFO 31.140.686 USA 
M70 NRG ENERGY Gas, Water, Electricity Mr Kirkland Andrews M 17-8-2011 CFO 35.128.000 USA 
71 
PUBLIC SERVICE 
ENTERPRISE GROUP  Gas, Water, Electricity Mrs Caroline Dolores Dorsa F 17-3-2011 CFO 31.725.000 USA 
M71 
GEORGIA POWER 
COMPANY Gas, Water, Electricity Mr W. Ron Hinson M 4-1-2013 CFO 28.803.000 USA 
72 HORMEL FOODS  Primary sector Mrs Jody H Feragen F 29-9-2010 CFO 4.915.880 USA 
M72 
TARGA RESOURCES 
PARTNERS LP Primary sector Mr Matthew J. Meloy M 20-12-2010 CFO 5.025.700 USA 
73 SEALED AIR  Wood, cork, paper Mrs Carol P Lowe F 24-5-2012 CFO 9.331.700 USA 
M73 MEADWESTVACO  Wood, cork, paper Mr E. Mark Rajkowski M 19-7-2004 CFO 10.283.000 USA 
74 
COGNIZANT 
TECHNOLOGY 
SOLUTIONS  Other services Mrs Karen McLoughlin F 8-2-2012 CFO 6.521.571 USA 
M74 ECHOSTAR  Other services Mr David Rayner M 4-12-2012 CFO 6.600.233 USA 
75 FMC TECHNOLOGIES  Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mrs Maryann T. Seaman F 4-11-2011 CFO 5.902.900 USA 
M75 FIRST SOLAR Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mr Mark Widmar M 15-3-2011 CFO 6.348.692 USA 
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76 CELGENE CORP Other services Mrs Jacqualyn A Fouse F 26-8-2010 CFO 11.734.306 USA 
M76 ADT CORPORATION  Other services Mr Michael Geltzeiler M 14-10-2013 CFO 9.913.000 USA 
77 COACH  Wholesale & retail trade Mrs Jane H Nielsen F 27-7-2011 CFO 3.531.897 USA 
M77 MRC GLOBAL  Wholesale & retail trade Mr James Braun M 17-10-2011 CFO 3.369.727 USA 
78 CVR ENERGY Primary sector Mrs Susan M Ball F 27-7-2012 CFO 4.023.400 USA 
M78 TIDEWATER Primary sector Mr Quinn P. Fanning M 31-7-2008 CFO 4.168.055 USA 
79 KRAFT FOODS GROUP Food, beverages, tobacco Mrs Teri L. List-Stoll F 3-9-2013 CFO 23.267.000 USA 
M79 CONAGRA FOODS Food, beverages, tobacco Mr John F. Gehring M 16-1-2009 CFO 20.405.300 USA 
80 
RESOLUTE FOREST 
PRODUCTS  Wood, cork, paper Mrs Jo-Ann Longworth F 20-7-2011 CFO 6.333.000 USA 
M80 DS SMITH  Wood, cork, paper Mr Adrian Marsh M 20-6-2013 CFO 5.597.699 USA 
81 NVIDIA  Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mrs Colette Kress F 16-9-2013 CFO 6.412.245 USA 
M81 TEREX COP Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mr Kevin Bradley M 14-1-2013 CFO 6.746.200 USA 
82 JONES LANG LASALLE  Other services Mrs Christie B Kelly F 16-5-2013 CFO 4.351.499 USA 
M82 H&R BLOCK  Other services Mr Gregory J. Macfarlane M 23-5-2012 CFO 4.537.779 USA 
83 
AMERICAN EAGLE 
OUTFITTERS  Wholesale & retail trade Mrs Mary M Boland F 31-5-2012 CFO 1.756.053 USA 
M83 BIG LOTS Wholesale & retail trade Mr Timothy A. Johnson M 23-8-2012 CFO 1.753.626 USA 
84 CARLYLE GROUP L.P. Other services Mrs Adena T Friedman F 13-2-2011 CFO 31.566.600 USA 
M84 
GENERAL GROWHTH 
PROPERTIE Other services Mr Michael B. Berman M 28-11-2011 CFO 27.282.405 USA 
85 
AMERICAN WATER 
WORKS COMPANY Gas, Water, Electricity Mrs Susan N Story F 20-2-2013 CFO 14.718.976 USA 
M85 PEPCO HOLDINGS Gas, Water, Electricity Mr Frederick Boyle M 26-3-2012 CFO 15.794.000 USA 
86 COVANCE  Other services Ms Alison Ann Cornell F 2-5-2012 CFO 2.556.588 USA 
M86 STARZ Other services Mr Scott Macdonald M 9-7-2012 CFO 2.176.050 USA 
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87 CHICOS FAS  Wholesale & retail trade Mrs Pamela K Knous F 23-6-2011 CFO 1.580.628 USA 
M87 TITAN MACHINERY  Wholesale & retail trade Mr Mark Kalvoda M 11-4-2011 CFO 1.444.074 USA 
88 MARKEL CORPORATION Insurance companies Mrs Anne G Waleski F 10-5-2010 CFO 11.777.814 USA 
M88 
HANOVER INSURANCE 
GROUP  Insurance companies Mr David Greenfield M 15-12-2010 CFO 11.410.600 USA 
89 COMERICA  Banks Mrs Karen L Parkhill F 27-7-2011 CFO 65.227.000 USA 
M89 
DISCOVER FINANCIAL 
SERVICES Banks Mr Mark Graf M 4-4-2011 CFO 73.491.315 USA 
90 AOL Other services Mrs Karen E Dykstra F 19-9-2012 CFO 2.983.400 USA 
M90 AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES  Other services Mr James Benson M 8-2-2012 CFO 2.600.627 USA 
91 
VISHAY 
INTERTECHNOLOGY IC Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mrs Lori Lipcaman F 17-8-2011 CFO 3.016.277 USA 
M91 BABCOCK & WILCOX  Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mr Anthony Colatrella M 14-11-2011 CFO 2.840.355 USA 
92 
GRANITE 
CONSTRUCTION  Construction Mrs Laurel J Krzeminski F 9-11-2010 CFO 1.729.487 USA 
M92 M.D.C. HOLDINGS Construction Mr John M. Stephens M 30-1-2012 CFO 1.945.441 USA 
93 TORO  Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mrs Renee J Peterson F 29-7-2011 CFO 1.002.748 USA 
M93 IDEXX LABORATORIES  Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mr Brian McKeon M 15-10-2013 CFO 1.103.602 USA 
94 LOUISIANA PACIFIC  Wood, cork, paper Ms Sallie B Bailey F 11-7-2011 CFO 2.331.000 USA 
M94 
MAYR-MELNHOF 
KARTON  Wood, cork, paper Mr Oliver Schumy M 7-5-2008 CFO 2.147.219 USA 
95 MCCLATCHY  Publishing, printing Mrs Elaine Lintecum F 16-5-2012 CFO 3.005.131 USA 
M95 JOHN WILEY & SONS Publishing, printing Mr John Kritzmacher M 3-6-2013 CFO 2.806.375 USA 
96 
MINE SAFETY 
APPLIANCES  Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mrs Stacy McMahan F 5-9-2013 CFO 1.111.746 USA 
M96 KAMAN  Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mr Robert D. Starr M 18-4-2013 CFO 1.096.993 USA 
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97 
CBL & ASSOCIATES 
PROPERTIES  Other services Mrs Farzana K Mitchell F 10-9-2012 CFO 7.089.736 USA 
M97 EXPEDIA Other services Mr Mark Okerstrom M 1-9-2011 CFO 7.085.195 USA 
98 SELECT COMFORT  Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Ms Wendy Lee Schoppert F 9-5-2011 CFO 342.021 USA 
M98 
SMITH & WESSON 
HOLDING  Wholesale & retail trade Mr Jeffrey D. Buchanan M 21-12-2010 CFO 326.989 USA 
99 TECUMSEH PRODUCTS  Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mrs Janice E Stipp F 18-10-2011 CFO 527.900 USA 
M99 
LINDSAY 
CORPORATION Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mr James Raabe M 9-5-2011 CFO 512.296 USA 
100 
NAVIGANT 
CONSULTING  Other services Mrs Lucinda M Baier F 25-2-2013 CFO 954.450 USA 
M100 
WINTHROP REALTY 
TRUST Other services Mr  John Garilli M 25-5-2012 CFO 923.163 USA 
101 WAUSAU PAPER. Wood, cork, paper Mrs Sherri L Lemmer F 30-4-2012 CFO 700.715 USA 
M101 POTLATCH Wood, cork, paper Mr Jerald W. Richards  M 5-8-2013 CFO 680.530 USA 
102 
STRATEGIC HOTELS & 
RESORTS Other services Mrs Diane M Morefield F 9-3-2010 CFO 2.406.417 USA 
M102 
QUINTILES 
TRANSNATIONAL 
HOLDINGS Other services Mr Kevin Gordon M 2-8-2010 CFO 2.499.153 USA 
103 MULTI COLOR  Publishing, printing Ms Sharon Eileen Birkett F 9-7-2010 CFO 839.550 USA 
M103 MEDIA GENERAL  Publishing, printing Mr James F. Woodward M 26-5-2011 CFO 773.421 USA 
104 
QUANTUM 
CORPORATION Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mrs Linda M. Breard F 11-1-2011 CFO 369.593 USA 
M104 
SILICON GRAPHICS 
INTERNATIONAL  Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling Mr Robert J. Nikl M 30-4-2012 CFO 407.853 USA 
105 BEBE STORES  Wholesale & retail trade Mrs Liyuan Woo F 30-4-2013 CFO 344.816 USA 
M105 PCM Wholesale & retail trade Mr Steve Geiser M 19-11-2012 CFO 365.735 USA 
 
34 
 
Notes with Appendix B:  
M## is the matched announcement regarding CEO/CFO turnover 
CEO is for Chief Executive Officer, CFO is for Chief Financial Officer, F is for Female, M is for Male
35 
 
Appendix C – Global Gender Gap – Global Index   
(source: World Economic Forum, 2016) 
 
Country Index Rank HIGH – LOW 
Austria .716 52 HIGH 
Belgium .745 24 LOW 
Denmark  .754 19 LOW 
Finland .845 2 LOW 
France .755 17 LOW 
Germany .766 13 LOW 
Greece .680 92 HIGH 
Ireland .797 6 LOW 
Italy .719 50 HIGH 
The Netherlands .756 16 LOW 
Norway .842 3 LOW 
Luxembourg* .734 34 - 
Sweden .815 4 LOW 
United Kingdom .752 20 LOW 
United States .722 45 HIGH 
Average            .760   27 
Weighted average          .743   34    
Index is the score on the Gender Gap Index; rank is the rank on the Gender Gap Index. HIGH or LOW is decided 
on the basis of being above or below the weighted average rank (i.e, 34). 
* Luxembourg is excluded from the HIGH-LOW classification as it exactly has the (weighted average rank), as a 
result, when comparing along this classification, we miss out on two announcements and total sample size is 
198 (in the case of all announcements) and 98 (in the cases of the matches). 
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Appendix D 
Summary statistics for the average abnormal returns in the estimation window 
 Total sample Female sample Male sample 
  alfa beta 
Market 
and risk 
adjusted 
returns 
(%) alfa beta 
Market 
and risk 
adjusted 
returns 
(%) alfa beta 
Market 
and risk 
adjusted 
returns 
(%) 
 
Mean return -0.0001 0.9462 0.0000 -0.0001 0.8695 0.0000 -0.0001 1.0230 0.0000 
Median 0.0001 0.9113 0.0000 0.0001 0.8770 0.0000 0.0002 0.9316 0.0000 
Standard 
deviation 0.0018 0.5175 0.0000 0.0020 0.4954 0.0000 0.0016 0.5300 0.0000 
Minimum -0.0127 -0.4363 0.0000 -0.0127 -0.4363 0.0000 -0.0066 -0.2712 0.0000 
Maximum 0.0039 3.2888 0.0000 0.0039 2.0714 0.0000 0.0029 3.2888 0.0000 
Skewness -2.6584 0.6968 -0.3011 -3.1535 0.3020 -0.4202 -1.5904 1.0143 -0.2256 
Kurtosis 14.0185 1.7431 1.3648 17.2153 -0.0007 1.8978 4.4714 2.8494 1.0294 
N 200 200 200 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Appendix E – Sensitivity analyses  
Panel A – Sensitivity Analysis for Relevant Press Releases in Event Window 
 This panel shows the (cumulative) average abnormal returns regarding the announcement of a CEO 
and  in the case of relevant and non-relevant releases from the press respectively  
  Relevant Press Releases No-relevant Press Releases 
     N 69 131 
AAR t=-2 0.0026 0.0018 
AAR t=-1 -0.0012 0.0020 
AAR t=0 -0.0029 0.0011 
AAR t=+1 0.0004 -0.0009 
AAR t=+2 0.0008 0.0003 
CAAR [-2;+2] -0.0003 0.0042 
CAAR [0;+1] -0.0025 0.0002 
CAAR [-1;+1] -0.0038 0.0022 
AAR is average abnormal return, CAAR is average abnormal returns; returns are estimated according 
to (1)-(4) in the main body of the paper. t relates to the day in the event window; in brackets is the 
time window in days. Relevant press releases relate to press releases covering the announcement of 
other executives or board members and to press releases related to financial issues, such as financial 
results and dividend declarations. Non-relevant press releases do not include such information.  
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Appendix E – continued  
 
Panel B - Sensitivity Analysis for Insider/Outsider Status of Announced CEO/CFO  
 This panel shows the (cumulative) average abnormal returns regarding the announcement of the CEO 
or CFO being an insider or an outsider respectively. 
  Insider Outsider 
N 106 94 
AAR t=-2 0.0026 0.0014 
AAR t=-1 0.0015 0.0002 
AAR t=0 -0.0014 0.0010 
AAR t=+1 0.0013 -0.0024 
AAR t=+2 0.0009 0.0000 
CAAR [-2;+2] 0.0049 0.0002 
CAAR [0;+1] -0.0001 -0.0015 
CAAR [-1;+1] 0.0013 -0.0012 
AAR is average abnormal return, CAAR is average abnormal returns; returns are estimated according 
to (1)-(4) in the main body of the paper. t relates to the day in the event window; in brackets is the 
time window in days. An insider is defined as a person that has been working at the firm at which she 
is appointment. With an outsider, this has not been the case for the last five years. 
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Appendix E - continued 
Panel C - Sensitivity Analysis for CEO or CFO Function of Announced Executive 
 This panel shows the (cumulative) average abnormal returns regarding the announcement of a CEO 
and CFO respectively. 
 
  CEO CFO 
N 42 158 
AAR t=-2 0.0010 0.0023 
AAR t=-1 0.0023 0.0005 
AAR t=0 0.0018 -0.0008 
AAR t=+1 -0.0001 -0.0006 
AAR t=+2 0.0067 -0.0012 
CAAR [-2;+2] 0.0117 0.0003 
CAAR [0;+1] 0.0017 -0.0014 
CAAR [-1;+1] 0.0040 -0.0009 
AAR is average abnormal return, CAAR is average abnormal returns; returns are estimated according 
to (1)-(4) in the main body of the paper. t relates to the day in the event window; in brackets is the 
time window in days. CEO relates to the newly announced top-executive being the chief executive 
officer; CFO relates to this person being the chief financial officer. 
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Appendix E – continued  
Panel D - ANOVA-tests for Sensitivity Analysis of Total Sample of 200 firms at CAAR [0;+1] 
  
 
Relevant  versus  
Not relevant  
press releases 
   (1) 
Insider  
versus   
Outsider 
   (2) 
CEO  
versus  
CFO 
   (3) 
F-value 0.2600 0.0663 0.2523 
P-value 0.6107 0.7971 0.6160 
This table shows the test results of on ANOVA for three different subgroups. Source: Appendix D 
The first analysis (1) goes into the role of additional information where we distinct between relevant and non-
relevant press releases. A relevant press release is defined as a press release covering the announcement of 
other executives or board members and press releases related to financial issues, such as financial results and 
dividend declarations (69 events relate to relevant, 131 to not relevant press releases).  
The second analysis (2) compares the impact of the news about whether the appointed CEO / CFO is an insider 
or an outsider. An insider is defined as a person that has been working at the firm at which she is appointment. 
With an outsider, this has not been the case for the last five years (106 events relate to insiders, 94 to 
outsiders). 
The third analysis (3) compares the impact of the appointment of a CEO vis-à-vis a CFO (42 events relate to 
CEOs, 158 to CFOs). 
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Appendix F – International perspective  
 
These for panels report the (cumulative) average abnormal returns in countries which score higher 
(HIGH) or lower (LOW) than the weighted average rank on the Gender Gap Index (see Appendix C) 
and the differential between the two groups and the (cumulative) average abnormal returns in the 
US and elsewhere for all turnover announcements regarding CEOs and CFOs (Panel A), for the 
turnover announcement regarding male CEOs and CFOs (Panel B), for the turnover announcement 
regarding female CEOs and CFOs (Panel C), and for the differential of the (cumulative) average 
abnormal returns (female minus male CEOs and CFOs) (Panel D) respectively. 
 
 
HIGH LOW 
HIGH-
LOW 
 
US non-US 
US-
nonUS 
Panel A – All  
N 123 75   100 100  
AAR t= -2 0.0026 0.0010 0.0016  0.0020 0.0023 -0.0004 
AAR t=-1 0.0019 -0.0006 0.0024  0.0005 0.0012 -0.0007 
AAR t=0 0.0005 -0.0024 0.0028  0.0009 -0.0067 0.0025 
AAR t=1 0.0020 -0.0043 0.0063  0.0002 -0.0010 0.0013 
AAR t=2 0.0020 -0.0022 0.0043  0.0020 -0.0009 0.0028 
CAAR [-2;+2] 0.0089 -0.0085 0.0174  0.0056 0.0000 0.0055 
CAAR [0;+1] 0.0024 -0.0067 0.0091  0.0012 -0.0026 0.0038 
CAAR [-1;+1] 0.0043 -0.0073 0.0115  0.0017 -0.0014 0.0031 
Panel B – Male  
N 54 44   50 50  
AAR t= -2 0.0013 0.0028 -0.0015  0.0016 0.0022 -0.0007 
AAR t=-1 -0.0011 0.0005 -0.0016  -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0004 
AAR t=0 0.0022 -0.0026 0.0048  0.0021 -0.0004 0.0025 
AAR t=1 0.0021 0.0016 0.0005  0.0000 0.0032 -0.0032 
AAR t=2 0.0028 0.0058 -0.0029  0.0033 0.0051 -0.0018 
CAAR [-2;+2] 0.0074 0.0082 -0.0008  0.0063 0.0098 -0.0036 
CAAR [0;+1] 0.0043 -0.0009 0.0052  0.0021 0.0028 -0.0007 
CAAR [-1;+1] 0.0032 -0.0004 0.0036  0.0014 0.0025 -0.0011 
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Appendix F - continued 
 
 
 
HIGH LOW 
HIGH-
LOW 
 
US non-US 
US-
nonUS 
Panel C – Female                                                                                                                                        
 
N 54 44   50 50  
AAR t= -2 0.0035 0.0011 0.0024  0.0021 0.0023 -0.0002 
AAR t=-1 0.0045 -0.0002 0.0047  0.0018 0.0027 -0.0009 
AAR t=0 -0.0004 -0.0022 0.0024  -0.0001 -0.0026 0.0025 
AAR t=1 0.0017 -0.0078 0.0095  0.0003 -0.0054 0.0057 
AAR t=2 0.0009 -0.0087 0.0096  0.0005 -0.0067 0.0072 
CAAR [-2;+2] 0.0102 -0.0184 0.0286  0.0046 -0.0098 0.0143 
CAAR [0;+1] 0.0013 -0.0106 0.0119  0.0002 -0.0080 0.0082 
CAAR [-1;+1] 0.0058 -0.0108 0.0166  0.0020 -0.0053 0.0073 
Panel D Difference  (Female - Male) 
 
N 54 44  
 
50 50  
AAR t= -2 0.0020 -0.0016 0.0036  0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 
AAR t=-1 0.0056 -0.0009 0.0065  0.0026 0.0029 -0.0003 
AAR t=0 -0.0024 -0.0006 -0.0019  -0.0021 -0.0024 0.0003 
AAR t=1 -0.0007 -0.0090 0.0083  0.0003 -0.0084 0.0085 
AAR t=2 -0.0020 -0.0144 0.0124  -0.0029 -0.0119 0.0089 
CAAR [-2;+2] 0.0024 -0.0265 0.0289  -0.0020 -0.0196 0.0175 
CAAR [0;+1] -0.0031 -0.0096 0.0064  -0.0021 -0.0108 0.0087 
CAAR [-1;+1] 0.0025 -0.0105 0.0130  0.0005 -0.0079 0.0084 
AAR is average abnormal return, CAAR is average abnormal returns; returns are estimated according 
to (1)-(4) in the main body of the paper. t relates to the day in the event window; in brackets is the 
time window in days.   
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of the sample 
 
Panel A – Firm characteristics (200 firms) 
 Total assets (USD 
million, 2013) 
Operating revenue 
(USD million, 2013) 
Number of employees 
(2013) 
Average 33,700 8,773 24,417 
Median  3,992 2,561 6,000 
Standard deviation 220,512 18,528 55,567 
Minimum 12 38 18 
Maximum 2,415,689 112,298 434,246 
 
Panel B – Composition (distribution of the sample of 200 firms over industries, years, countries) 
Industry  % Year % Country % 
Banks 3.8 2004 0.5 Austria 1.0 
Chemicals 6.7 2005 1.9 Belgium 1.9 
Construction 1.0 2006 1.0 Denmark 1.4 
Food  4.3 2007 1.0 Finland 1.9 
Hotels 1.9 2008 1.4 France 3.8 
Insurance 3.3 2009 1.9 Germany 5.7 
Machinery 15.7 2010 12.4 Greece 1.4 
Metals 1.0 2011 24.8 Ireland 1.9 
Other 20.0 2012 29.5 Italy 1.0 
Primary products 2.9 2013 23.8 Luxembourg 1.0 
Publishing 5.2 2014 1.9 Netherlands 1.9 
Telecom 5.7   Norway 1.4 
Textiles 1.0   Sweden 10.0 
Transport 4.8   UK 5.2 
Utilities 4.8   US 60.0 
Consumer goods 12.9     
Woods 5.2     
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Table 2 
Average abnormal returns (AARs) of the announcement of CEO/CFO appointments for the total 
sample (N = 200; 100 female appointments and 100 male appointments) 
 
Day  AAR (%) Standardized cross-  Corrado’s rank 
    sectional test (p-value)  test (p-value)  
-2  0.2058   0.3214   0.3523 
-1  0.0870   0.4938   0.6380 
 0  -0.0278   0.9370   0.7858 
+1  -0.0483   0.3824   0.4659 
+2  0.0494   0.9004   0.8750   
AAR is average abnormal return; the tests are explained in Appendix A of the paper. Day relates to 
the day in the event window.   
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Table 3 
Difference in average abnormal returns (AARs) between the announcement of female and male 
CEO/CFO appointments (calculated as female minus male) (N = 100 pairs) 
 
Day  difference in Standardized cross-  Corrado’s rank 
  AARs (%) sectional test (p-value)  test (p-value)  
-2  0.0309   0.8291   0.8924 
-1  0.2731   0.1606   0.2000 
 0  -0.2238   0.2390   0.1940 
+1  -0.4201   0.4700   0.7823 
+2  -0.7386   0.0763   0.1621   
AAR is average abnormal return; the tests are explained in Appendix A of the paper. Day relates to 
the day in the event window.   
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Table 4 
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) of top-executive appointments in the total sample  
(N = 200; 100 female and 100 male) 
 
CAAR   CAAR  Standardized  Corrado’s rank test 
window (%)  cross-sectional test (p-value) 
    (p-value)      
[-2; +2]   0.2662   0.8366   0.8031 
[0;1]  -0.0761   0.4777   0.4791 
[-1;+1]   0.0109   0.7991   0.7592   
CAAR is average abnormal returns; returns are estimated according to (1)-(4) in the main body of the 
paper and test statistics according to Appendix A. In brackets is the time windows in days.   
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Table 5 
Difference in cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) between female and male CEO/CFO 
appointments (calculated as female minus male)  (N = 100 pairs) 
 
CAAR   Difference Standardized  Corrado’s rank test 
window in CAAR cross-sectional test (p-value) 
  (%)  (p-value)      
[-2; +2]  -1.0784   0.2314   0.4129 
[0;1]  -0.6438   0.1575   0.2652 
[-1;+1]  -0.3707   0.6770   0.8654   
CAAR is average abnormal returns; returns are estimated according to (1)-(4) in the main body of the 
paper and test statistics according to Appendix A. In brackets is the time windows in days.  
